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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

Case No. 20060255

EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS
INTEGRATED CARE,

(Oral Argument Requested)

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Defendant/Appellee.

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Article 8, §3 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(b) (Supp.
2002).

ISSUE PRESENTED and STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Whether the district court correctly granted in part Salt Lake County's ("the
County") motion for partial summary judgment and denied Emergency Physicians
Integrated Care's ("EPIC") motion for partial summary judgment when it found that
EPIC's claim of quantum meruit failed because no significant benefit was conferred
upon the County by EPIC. "When reviewing a district court's denial of summary
judgment, we grant no deference to the district court's legal conclusions and review
1

them for correctness." Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy. Inc.. 2003 UT 43 ^
14, 79 P.3d 922. A quantum meruit claim "is a mixed question of law and fact."
Desert Miriah. Inc. v. B & L Auto. Inc., 2000 UT 83 T|9. 12 P.3d 580.

While the

district court's legal conclusions are reviewed for "correctness, [this Court] grant[s]
it broad discretion in its application of unjust enrichment law to the stipulated facts."
I d at U 12.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The following statutes are determinative in this matter and are set forth
verbatim in Epic Briefs Addenda, Addendum A and in County's Addendum A.
•

Utah Code Ann. § 17-50-319 (Supp. 2001)

•

Utah Code Ann. § 17-15-17 (Supp. 1999)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

a. Nature of the Case:
Prior to April 30,2001, Salt Lake County paid the billed medical charges
for all Salt Lake County Jail inmates, except Federal inmates, who received outside
medical treatment1 as an expense "necessarily incurred in the support of persons
charged with or convicted of a criminal offense and committed to the county jail"
Utah Code Ann. §17-15-17(3) (Supp. 1999). Following the passage of S.B. 152
Medical Expenses of County Inmates in 2001, the County began paying all billed

1

Additionally, it was County policy to deny medical claims to the extent that
the treated injuries were self-inflicted or due to a pre-existing condition.
2

medical expenses of booked inmates2, including self-inflicted injuries and preexisting conditions, at the "noncapitated state Medicaid rates." Utah Code Ann. §1750-319 (2)(b).
EPIC filed its first Notice of Claim on November 20,2001, its second Notice
of Claim on January 17, 2003 and filed its original complaint on January 19, 2003.
EPIC's amended complaint included the patients from its first and second notice of
claims3 plus an additional eighty-two new claims. The sole cause of action in EPIC's
amended complaint was a claim for quantum meruit.
b. Course of Proceedings:
Following its amended complaint, EPIC filed a motion for partial summary
judgment arguing its quantum meruit theory. The County opposed EPIC's motion
and filed its own motion for partial summary judgment arguing that UCA §17-50319(1 )(k) and (2) controlled the payment of medical expenses for jail inmates. At
the motion hearing, the trial court requested supplemental briefs regarding the
County's obligations under the United States Supreme Court case, City of Revere
v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, (1983). In its supplemental
briefing, EPIC argued that additional provisions of UCA §17-50-319 applied, creating
a statutory obligation that could be relied upon to establish the County was conferred
2

Claims for federal inmates are still denied by the County as such claims
are covered by the federal government.
3

Eight original patients were omitted from the amended complaint, six from
the first notice and two from the second notice.
3

a benefit.4
c. Disposition at Trial Court:
The court denied EPIC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
granted the County's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to the extent that Plaintiff
had not shown its entitlement to recover under a claim of quantum meruit.
Memorandum Decision and Order dated February 8, 2006. The district court also
noted in its order that the general provisions of UCA §17-50-319, cited by EPIC,
were inapplicable. As EPIC's only claim was for quantum meruit, the case was
dismissed with prejudice by the court's order of March 2, 2006.
EXCEPTION TO EPIC'S STATEMENT OF FACTS.
AND STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL RELEVANT FACTS
The County stipulates to the statement of facts set forth by EPIC, Brief of
Appellant EPIC ["EPIC Brief] at 4-8, except as to the following:
1. County's Exception to EPIC's Statement of Facts:
EPIC submitted the following facts:
1. 4. When medical situations arise at the jail, nurses
contracted by the County to provide services, and who
work at the jail, screen the inmates. A nurse determines
whether the medical care required is either beyond the
capacity of the medical personnel at the jail to handle or
whether emergency medical services from outside the jail
are necessary.

4

Although EPIC argued the statutory language required payment, EPIC did
not again amend its complaint. Thus, the only cause of action in EPIC's
amended complaint is for quantum meruit.
4

EPIC Brief at 5. The County disputes in part the accuracy of this fact. The
County employs 48 registered licensed RNs and 2 LPNs so that there is always an
available nurse at the jail. (R. 103: Deposition of Troy Dial ["Dial Depo"] 22:18-20;
23:17-21) Further, the County contracts with a company called Wellcon to provide
physician services at the jail and to be on call, 24-7, to consult with the nursing staff.
(R. 102: Dial Depo 19: 1-17; R. 106: Dial Depo 36:8-9).
2. 9. EPIC has requested payment for its emergency medical
services provided to Salt Lake County jail inmates from the
County but, as to some inmates, the County has denied
that it has any legal duty to pay for the medical services
provided by EPIC.
EPIC Brief at 6. The County disputes in part the accuracy of this fact. While the
County admitted that EPIC physicians treated all the patients listed in its notice of
claims and attached to their amended complaint, the County denied that it was billed
for all patients listed. (R. 75) Further, as to certain patients listed by EPIC, the
County denied owing monies as payment had been made, the patient was not a
County inmate at the time of service, or the County had no legal duty to pay. (R. 75)
2. County's Additional Relevant Facts
The County submits the following additional relevant facts:
1. For eligible claims arising after April 30, 2001, the County paid EPIC at
the "noncapitated" state Medicaid rate. (R. 109, 240).
2. The medical services provided at the jail are akin to the care provided
by an Instacare clinic. Medical needs beyond that level are sent to a hospital. (R.
5

106:DialDepo34: 17-19).
3. When an emergency arises and an ambulance is called, it is the
paramedics who determine where the inmate is taken based on the inmate's medical
condition. (R. 104: Dial Depo. 27:9-11).
4. EPIC sought recovery for its physicians for the difference between their
billed charges and the statutory rate paid by the County under a theory of quantum
meruit. (R. 240).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
EPIC's original complaint alleged a violation of Utah Code Ann §17-50-319
and a claim for unjust enrichment. Thereafter, EPIC amended its complaint to state
only a claim in quantum meruit.5 Epic argues that its physicians provide the County
with a substantial benefit by enabling the County to discharge its constitutional duty
and thus save the costs associated with lawsuits and the hiring of its own physicians.
In reality, the medical expertise and care, for which EPIC seeks enhanced
compensation, is given directly to the emergency room patient. It is the patient who
retains the true benefit of the doctor's services. While equity may demand that the
patient compensate the physician, as between the physician and the County it is not
unjust for the County to retain the incidental benefit of the patient receiving medical

5

EPIC briefly mentions that this case also falls under an implied-in-fact
contract theory. EPIC Brief at 17. However, as they have failed to address this
issue before the trial court or in their brief, it should be considered waived.
Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 2003 UT App 379,1J20, 80 P.3d 546.
6

care.
When analyzing EPIC's request for partial summary judgment, the district
court set out to determine if EPIC could meet the necessary elements under
quantum meruit. The district court, relying upon Myrtle Beach Hospital, Inc. v. City
of Myrtle Beach, 532 S.E.2d 868 (SC 2000), determined that EPIC physicians did
not confer a direct benefit on the County. The district court turned to Myrtle Beach
because it is the only cost allocation case directly on point.
The cases relied upon by EPIC do not establish that a benefit was
conferred upon the County. The district court reviewed the cited cases and referred
to Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319, which enumerates county charges and directly
addresses the payment of medical care costs for jail inmates at healthcare facilities
but is silent as to physicians. Nevertheless, given that EPIC's sole claim is under
quantum meruit, the district court did not address the applicability of the medical cost
allocation provision of UCA §17-50-319 but simply determined that the general
provisions of section 17-50-319 (a), (b), ( c), (f) and (i) did not require payment by
the County to EPIC.
Finally, EPIC argues that the general provisions of UCA §17-50-319
bolster its quantum meruit claim.

However, EPIC's arguments, which rely upon

general provisions relating to the sheriff's office, fail to establish that EPIC conferred
a benefit upon the County.

EPIC's efforts at extrapolating from the general

provisions of the statute while ignoring the more specific provisions at issue, defy
7

basic principals of statutory construction. Therefore, the district court was correct
in granting the County's summary judgment motion, in part, as a matter of law. This
court should affirm the district court's order.
ARGUMENT
1. EPIC Fails to Establish a Quantum Meruit Claim.
The district court correctly ruled that EPIC failed to establish a right to
recovery under its sole claim of quantum meruit. In order to succeed, EPIC was
required to show:
(1) a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) an
appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and
(3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit
under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the
conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value.
Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984). Moreover, this court "afford[s]
the district court broad discretion in its application of the law of unjust enrichment to
the facts of the particular case." Desert Miriah, Inc. v.B&L Auto, Inc. 2000 UT 83,
1J17, 12P.3d580, 583.
EPIC argues on appeal as it did below, that the following "benefits" satisfy
the first element of quantum meruit: 1) the County discharges its constitutional duty
and thereby minimizes any damage awards from civil rights lawsuits and 2) an
efficient use of tax payer money along with the cost savings of "not retaining [a] fulltime . . . staff of physicians" or the "overhead costs [of] maintaining a health care
facility." EPIC Brief at 17-18. EPIC is unable to argue that a direct benefit is
8

conferred upon the County.
A benefit may be "beneficial services conferred; satisfaction of a debt or
duty owed . . .; or anything which adds to [ones] security or advantage." Baugh v.
Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335, 337 (Utah 1947). However, as a general rule
one must first exhaust available legal remedies before recovering on the basis of the
equitable doctrine of quantum meruit. Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097,1099 (UT App
1988). EPIC made no attempt to establish its efforts of recovery from the patient
receiving the direct benefits. Instead, EPIC relies upon the County's supposed
obligation to obtain medical care for inmates as the basis for its recovery under
quantum meruit.
When it considered the circumstances of the case and applied them to
unjust enrichment law, the district court properly determined that EPIC's alleged
"benefits" did not meet the first element in the quantum meruit analysis.
A. The Alleged Benefit of Discharging the County's Constitutional
Duty to Inmates is Merely Incidental.
EPIC argues that the County has an equitable duty to pay the difference
between EPIC's billed charges and the noncapitated Medicaid rate already paid by
the County. EPIC's argument is premised upon the County's obligation to obtain
medical services for inmates6. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hospital, 463 U.S. 239,
Notwithstanding any statements to the contrary, the County's retains its
defense that certain patient claims were properly denied as the patient was not
"in custody" at the time of service. (R. 9).
9

102 S.Ct. 2979 (1983) established a governmental entity's constitutional obligation
to obtain necessary medical treatment for pretrial detainees. Revere involved the
payment for medical treatment provided to a man who was shot while attempting to
flee the scene of a crime. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that
inherent in the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment was a constitutional duty to pay for the medical services rendered.
Massachusetts General Hospital v. City of Revere, 385 Mass. 772,774,434 N.E.2d
185,196 (1982). The United States Supreme Court reversed.
The Court first held that the Eighth Amendment applied only after
conviction and therefore had no application to pretrial detainees. Instead, the proper
constitutional provision was the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which required "the responsible government or governmental agency to provide
medical care to persons... who have been injured while being apprehended by the
police." 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 2983 (1983)7.
As to the allocation of costs, the Court held that it was a matter of state
law. "As long as the medical care needed is in fact provided, the Constitution does
not dictate how the cost of that care should be allocated as between the entity and
7

The Court did not articulate the appropriate standard to determine if a
government agency has violated its Due Process obligations to those detainees
in its care because under the facts of the case, a Due Process violation was not
at issue as the needed medical care had been provided. However, it did
establish a floor, concluding that "the due process rights of a [pretrial detainee]
are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a
convicted prisoner." Id. (emphasis added).
10

the provider of care." Id. at 245.
Proper medical treatment is the real "beneficial service[] conferred" by the
emergency room physicians. Baugh v. Darley, 184 P.2d at 337. Analyzing this
"benefit," it is the patient who receives and retains the value of the physician's
expertise, not the County.

While equity may require the patient to provide

restitution8, the incidental benefit conferred on the County of having a place to take
an inmate is insufficient to meet the first element of the unjust enrichment branch of
quantum meruit.
Contrary to EPIC's assertions, the district court found Myrtle Beach
Hospital, Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 532 S.E.2d 868 (SC 2000), persuasive
because it is the only case to analyze the issue of allocation of costs under a
quantum meruit test and directly addresses the "benefit" of discharging a
governmental entity's constitutional duty9. In Myrtle Beach, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina reached the hospital's quantum meruit claim only after determining
that its statutory claim failed. The court reasoned that the state legislature, by
requiring county and state jailers to pay for medical care, necessarily excluded cities
from that obligation by omitting them from the statutes. Id. at 871.
8

Even the legislature recognized this fact, when requiring billing to any
private insurance held by a county inmate before the expense becomes a proper
county charge. UCA §17-50-319(2)(a).
9

The cases relied upon by EPIC begin and end their analysis with an
interpretation of their state statutes or for Lutheran Medical Center v. City of
Omaha, 429 N.W.2d 347 (Neb. 1988) the common law of Nebraska.
11

On the hospital's quantum meruit theory, the court held:
[T]he Hospital cannot prevail on this equitable theory. The first
two elements are that the City received and retained a benefit.
Here it is the detainee rather than the City that receives and
retains the benefits conferred by the Hospital. Further, since the
only duty on the City is that imposed by the Due Process Clause
of the federal constitution, and since that duty is fulfilled, 'by
seeing that [the detainees are] taken promptly to a hospital that
provides the treatment necessary for his injury,' [] we do not
perceive any inequity in not requiring the City to reimburse the
Hospital. To be sure, the City receives an incidental benefit in
the sense that the existence of the Hospital facilitates the City's
constitutional duty to ensure the detainee receives necessary
medical care.

Myrtle Beach± 532 S.E.2d at 873 (internal citations and notes omitted)(emphasis
added). This court should affirm the district court's ruling that the "benefit" of taking
prisoners to the emergency rooms where EPIC's physicians work, is only an
incidental benefit and thus fails to satisfy the first element of a quantum meruit test.
Interestingly, EPIC's first benefit argument also ignores the legal reality, as
EPIC itself has expressed and the district court emphasized, that emergency room
physicians are under a federal statutory duty to render necessary medical care to all
emergency room patients. Moreover, physicians who fail to comply face possible
personal liability10. It is well established that "the mere fact that a person benefits
10

"When individuals in need of emergency medical care present themselves
to health care facilities, the facilities, and the individual physicians working at the
facilities, have an obligation under Federal law to provide emergency medical
treatment.... Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"),
42 U.S.C. §1395dd. (R. 84); "[U]nder 42 U.S.C. §1395dd(d), hospitals and
physicians may be subject to civil penalties and liability for failure to comply...."

12

another is not by itself sufficient to require the other to make restitution. The value
of services performed by a person for his own advantage and from which another
benefits incidentally are not recoverable" Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557
(Utah 1984). Applying this reasoning to the facts in this case, it is to the physician's
own benefit to treat patients regardless of payment, because doing so satisfies a
federal statutory duty.
Furthermore, while it is true that the United State Supreme Court noted that
" i f . . . the governmental entity can obtain the medical care needed . . . only by
paying for it, then it must pay. City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital,
463 U.S. 239, 245 (1983). The Supreme Court went on to acknowledge that a
physician's statutory obligation may prove to be a possible alternative to an entity
paying for medical care, stating "[t]here are, however, other means by which an
entity could meets its [constitutional] obligation. Many hospitals are subject to
federal or state laws that require them to provide care to indigents", Revere 463
U.S. at 244-246. (emphasis added).
Therefore, given EPIC's own obligations under federal law and the
unequivocal fact that "it is the detainee rather than the [County] that receives and
retains the benefits conferred by [EPIC]", any benefit to the County provided by
being allowed to occasionally take inmates to emergency rooms staffed by EPIC
physicians, is merely incidental. Myrtle Beach, 532 S.E.2d at 873.
(R. 149).
13

B. The Cost Saving of Hiring Physician Is Incidental
By asserting that its quantum meruit benefit should be measured by the
value of not only the physicians' services but also by the value of the physical
facilities (i.e., hospital or clinic) in which those services are rendered,11 EPIC's
second benefit argument is both confusing and inconsistent with its claim that
"physicians" are separate and apart from "facilities" within the meaning of the Utah
Statute Sec. 17-50-319. It appears that EPIC is trying to "have its cake and eat it
too." It insists on one hand that its physicians are not subject to the Medicaidgoverned rate structure imposed by Sec. 17-50-319, as the "[h]ealthcare
professionals such as emergency room doctors opted out." Epic Brief at 27. Yet,
on the other hand, it would recover both for the value of the physicians' services and
for the costs arising from the maintenance of a health care facility (from which it
seeks to distance itself). Epic Brief at 27. EPIC cannot have it both ways.
More importantly, EPIC's argument again ignores the reality that the
primary beneficiary of the physician's service is the patient, not the County. Any cost
savings to the County in not having a full-time emergency room doctor on staff are
merely incidental. This Court should uphold the district court's application of the facts

11

EPIC maintains that the second benefit to the County includes the "money
the County saves by not retaining the full-time services of a staff of physicians
capable of dealing with all emergency care that may arise at the jail, along with
associated savings of overhead costs associated with maintaining a health care
facility at the jail that is capable of handling a wide variety of medical needs."
Epic's Brief at 17-18. (emphasis added).
14

to unjust enrichment law and deny EPIC's appeal.
C. There is No injustice in County Retaining the Alleged "Benefit"
The district court recognized that under the circumstances of this case,
EPIC could not, as a matter of law, meet the third element of quantum meruit,
either. First, it is the patient that receives and retains the real benefit of the
physician's service. Second, EPIC's statutory duty, irrespective of the County,
allows the same patient to present himself to the emergency room and be
treated. In this case the alleged "value" is the difference between the Medicaid
rate paid by the County and EPIC's billed charges.
Therefore, as between the County and EPIC, circumstances are not such
that "it [is] inequitable for the conferee to retain the [incidental] benefit without
payment of its value." Berrett, 690 P.2d at 55712. EPIC fails as a matter of law
to establish a quantum meruit claim and this Court should uphold the district
court's application of unjust enrichment law and deny EPIC recovery.
2.

The District Court's Order is in Line with Cases Relied Upon

by EPIC.
EPIC's analysis of Myrtle Beach is inaccurate. In fact, Myrtle Beach is in
line with EPIC's own premise that "once a duty to provide inmates with necessary
medical treatment is established, whether by statute or constitutional obligation,

12

There is nothing that prevents EPIC from seeking recovery from the
patients themselves.
15

absent legislative directive to the contrary, cities or counties are obligated to pay
for those services." EPIC Brief at 20-21. (Emphasis added). In Myrtle Beach, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina looked to state statutes and found a "legislative
directive to the contrary." It was this determination that allowed the court to even
begin a quantum meruit analysis.
Contrary to EPIC's assertions, the distinction for the South Carolina court was
not one between pre-trail detainees and post conviction inmates but between "city"
inmates and "county or state" inmates. The South Carolina court noted that the
statutes relied upon by the hospital specifically referenced either the duties of the
state or the duties of counties. It was the hospital's contention that the court should
infer from those statutes that cities are under similar obligations. However, the court
in Myrtle Beach applied the well-established rule of statutory construction expressio
unius est exclusio alterius and held in part that the legislature's failure to specifically
include cities along with the county and state as responsible entities for expenses
incurred for inmate health care, meant there was no statutory obligation on the city.
Id. at 871.
Myrtle Beach is not alone in finding exclusions to such statutes. In Meriter
Hospital, Inc., v. Dane County, 268 Wis.2d 658,673 N.W.2d 328 (Wl App 2003), the
issue was whether Dane County had to pay for all the medical expenses of an
indigent prisoner even after he was no longer "held under the state criminal laws" by
the sheriff. The court concluded that under Wisconsin statutes, the county was
16

required to pay the medical expenses only while the inmate was "held" but "was no
longer liable for medical costs incurred after the trial court dismissed charges." Id. at
666.
Likewise, in Craven County Hospital Corp. v. Lenoir County, et al., 75 N.C.
App. 453, 331 S.E.2d 690 (NC App. 1985), the facts in that case13 removed the
patient from the state statutes requiring payment. The Court found that the City was
not liable because the statute dealing with cities required "confinement" and that was
not the case as the officers never arrested the man but simply transported him. The
County was not liable because the man was never "in the custody" of the sheriff.
Further, there were no express promise to pay by the City or the County as was
alleged in Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 294 (N.C. 1926), relied on by EPIC.
In fact, the Spicer court held that the general rule in North Carolina was "that, in the
absence of some express provisions of the law, the public is not liable to a physician
or surgeon for services rendered prisoners, even though they are insolvent, and
unable to pay for such services themselves." Craven County, 331 S.E.2d at 693.
In Mercy Hospital Medical Center v. County of Marion, 590 N.W.2d 41, 44
(Iowa 1999), the court determined that the patient did not qualify as a "prisoner" under
the statute because he was not in custody of the sheriff at the time of service.
Therefore the County was not liable to the hospital. Accord, LaCrosse Lutheran
13

The case involved an inebriated man who was picked up by city police
officers. The man fell and hit his head when he got out of the police car on his
way into the county jail. He was taken to the hospital where he later died.
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Hospital v. LaCrosse County, 133 Wis 2d 335, 395, N.W.2d 612
(Wis. Ct. App. 1986)(Patient was not from the jail therefore statute didn't apply).
Most importantly, the cases relied upon by EPIC are clearly distinguishable
because in answering the question of the proper allocation of medical costs as
between the provider and the entity, these courts analyze only their state statutes (or
common law). For example, Poudre Valley Health Care, Inc. v. CityofLoveland, 85
P.3d 558,560 (Colo. App. 2003) involves a statute, similar to Utah's before the 2001
amendment, which does not include an express allocation of medical costs14. While
the issue of allocation of costs under Utah's former statute was not addressed by
Utah's courts, the County interpreted our statute in much the same way that the
Poudre Valley court interpreted Colorado's statute and paid for the medical expenses
billed.
Similarly, in Hospital Bd. of Directors of Lee County v. Durkis, 426 S.2d 50,
51 (Fla. App. 1982), the court found that Florida's general statute, which required the
14

Colo. Rev. Statutes. §16-3-401(2): "Persons arrested or in custody shall
be treated humanely and shall be provided with adequate food, shelter, and, if
required, medical treatment. Anyone receiving medical treatment while held in
custody may be assessed a medical treatment charge as provided by in section
17-26-104.5, C.R.S."
Cf., Utah Code Ann. §17-22-8 (1)(Supp 2005) provides: "[T]he sheriff shall: . .
provide them necessary food, clothing, and bedding in the manner prescribed by
the county legislative body." Along with, UCA §17-15-17 (3) (Supp 1999): "[T]he
expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged with or
convicted of a criminal offense and committed to the county jail."
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establishment of "rules and regulations with reference to furnishing medical attention
to county prisoners," included an inherent duty to pay.15
Poudre Valley and Durkis are in accord with several other state court cases,
including The United Hospital v. D'Annunzio, 514 N.W.2d 681, 684-686 (N.D. 1994)
and Smith v. Linn County, 342 N.W.ed 861,863 (Iowa 1984) which were also cited by
EPIC. These state courts analyzed similarly worded statutes16 to determine who
should pay for inmate care. The majority of courts have implied a duty to pay when
given a statutory duty to ensure medical care with no specific reference to payment
of that care.17
The cases upon which EPIC relies deal with general statutory obligations to
provide medical care to prisoners, whereas Utah's legislature has specifically
addressed the issue of the allocation of medical costs of jail inmate, and has excluded
physicians.

15

Bi/f see, Metropolitan Dade County v. P.L. Dodge Foundations, et al, 509
S.2d 1170, 1175 (Fla App. 1987)(Proof of indigence a prerequisite for liability of
governmental entity for medical care costs.)
16

See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. §356.15 (1995)"AII charges and expenses for
the safekeeping and maintenance of prisoners . . ."; ND St § 12-444.1-14(6)
(1994) "Ensure that inmates have adequate medical care."
17

ln fact, of the cases relied upon by EPIC, only Washington had a statute
that specifically required that "[pjayment for emergency or necessary health care
shall be by the governing unit." Revised Code of Washington § 70.48.130 (1989).
19

3. EPIC's Statutory Argument Does Not Aid Its Quantum Meruit Claim
EPIC cannot rely on the general provisions of UCA § 17-50-319 to bolster its
claim for relief under quantum meruit. EPIC's argument is contrary to well established
rules of statutory construction. It is a cardinal rule that "when two provisions address
the same subject matter and one provision is general while the other is specific, the
specific provision controls." Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 882
P.2d 1143, 1145-1146 (Utah 1994)(Subsection dealing specifically with household
relatives controlled over general provision on permissive users); State v. Vigil, 842
P.2d843, 845-846 (Utah 1992)(Analyzing UCA §76-4-101, the court held that "the
more specific requirement of intent in paragraph (2)... takes precedence over the
general culpability requirement in paragraph (1)."); Osuala v. Aetna Life & Gas. 608
P.2d 242, 242-243 (Utah 1980)(applying the rule to UCA §§ 31-41-6 & 7).
Applying this rule to UCA §17-50-319, it is clear that paragraphs (1 )(k) and (2)18
specifically deal with the cost of providing medical care to jail inmates and provides,
in sum, that absent private inmate insurance or a contract, the County will pay the

18

(1 )(k) for a county of the first or second class and subject to Subsection
(2), expenses incurred by a health care facility in providing medical services at
the request of a county sheriff for existing conditions of:...
(2)(a) expenses described in Subsection (1)(k) are a county charge only
to the extent that they exceed any private insurance in effect that covers those
expenses.
(b) if there is no contract between a county jail and a health care
facility that establishes a fee schedule for medical services rendered, expenses
under Subsection (1)(k) shall be commensurate with the current noncapitated
state Medicaid rates....
20

noncapitated state Medicaid rates. In contrast, the paragraphs cited by EPIC, (1)(a),
(b), (c), (f) and (i)19 are all generalized provisions that deal with expenses incurred by
the county or by the sheriffs office but do not specifically address medical care costs.
Therefore, these provisions do not apply because they are superceded by the more
specific provisions of § 17-50-319(1 )(k) and (2) which detail the subject of rates for
County inmate medical services.
By purposefully excluding themselves from the coverage of the amended
statute, the emergency physicians gambled on procuring a better private contract rate
for themselves for provision of inmate medical services. However, no contract has yet
been executed between EPIC and the County. The instant action by EPIC is simply
an attempt to insulate EPIC from the risk it intentionally assumed by opting out of the
statutory payment scheme.
EPIC argues that the County's position reflects an "irrational" interpretation of
Sec. 17-50-319 because it suggests that "facilities" should be reimbursed for prisoner

19

(1)(a) those incurred against the county by any law;
(b)the necessary expenses of the county attorney or district attorney
incurred in criminal cases arising in the county, and all other expenses
necessarily incurred by the county or district attorney in the prosecution of
criminal cases, except jury and witness fees;
(c) the expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged
with or convicted of a criminal offense and committed to the county jail;
(f) the contingent expenses necessarily incurred for the use and benefit of
the county;
(i) the necessary expenses of the sheriff and deputies incurred in civil and
criminal cases arising in the county, and all other expenses necessarily incurred
by the sheriff and deputies performing the duties imposed upon them by law;
21

medical care (albeit at a reduced Medicaid rate), while physicians would receive
nothing. EPIC Brief at 26. However, the logical outcome of EPIC's position is equally
irrational, subjecting "facilities" to limited Medicaid payment schedules while
physicians would be permitted to charge whatever amount they like.

EPIC's

interpretation, and its desired relief, would improperly give preferential treatment to
physicians over health care facilities.

CONCLUSION
Under Revere, the County has a constitutional duty to make available needed
medical care for its inmates. Once needed medical care is provided, the County's
constitutional duty is fulfilled. Any allocation of costs between the provider of the
health care and the governmental entity is a matter of state law, not federal
constitutional law.
EPIC's physicians lobbied and succeeded in excluding themselves from the
payment provisions of U.C.A. §17-50-319, in a gamble to secure a higher paying
contract than the legislature granted. Absent such a contract, the County has no
statutory duty to pay EPIC.
EPIC's claims under quantum meruit also fail as the County receives only an
incidental, not a primary benefit, when EPIC treats inmates brought to facilities where
they work.
This Court should affirm the district court's determination that EPIC failed to
22

establish its claim of quantum meruit. Accordingly, the district court's order should be
affirmed.
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U.C.A. 1953 § 17-15-17

UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 17. COUNTIES
CHAPTER 15. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Copyright ® 1953-1999 by the State of Utah and LEXIS Law Publishing, a

division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights

reserved.
17-15-17

County expenses enumerated.

County charges are:
(1) those incurred against the county by any law;
(2) the necessary expenses of the county attorney or district attorney
incurred in criminal cases arising in the county, and all other expenses
necessarily incurred by him in the prosecution of criminal cases, except jury and
witness fees;
(3) the expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged with
or convicted of a criminal offense and committed to the county jail;
(4) the sums required by law to be paid to jurors in civil cases for counties
not within the state district court administrative system;
(5) all charges and accounts for services rendered by any justice court judge
for services in the trial and examination of persons charged with a criminal
offense not otherwise provided for by law;
(6) the contingent expenses necessarily incurred for the use and benefit of
the county;
(7) every other sum directed by law to be raised for any county purposes under
the direction of the governing body of the county or declared a county charge;
(8) the fees of constables for services rendered in criminal cases;
(9) the necessary expenses of the sheriff and his deputies incurred in civil
and criminal cases arising in the county, and all other expenses necessarily
incurred by the sheriff and his deputies performing the duties imposed upon them
by law; and
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U.C.A. 1953 § 17-15-17
(10) the sums required by law to be paid by the county to jurors and witnesses
serving at inquests and in criminal cases in justice courts.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 538; C.L. 1917, § 1434; R.S. 1933, 19-11-17; L.
1941, Ch. 20, § 1; C. 1943, 19-11-17; L. 1977, ch. 212, § 6; 1987, ch. 181, § 1;
1988, ch. 152, § 2; 1990, ch. 59, § 5; 1993, ch. 38, § 8.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Amendment Notes. --The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "or
district attorney" in Subsection (2).
Cross-References. --County audit, notice of, § 17-36-40.
Courtrooms, cost of furnishings, § 78-7-13.
Indigent pupils at deaf and blind schools, expenses of, §§ 53A-25-101 et seq.,
53A-25-201 et seq.
Prisoners, care of generally, § 17-22-8.
Sanity hearings, costs of, § 77-15-9.
Settlement and allowances of accounts by county legislative body, § 17-5- 218.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Expenses of county attorney.
While the district attorney, under Subsection (2) of this section, may incur
necessary expenses in prosecution of criminal cases and may make them county
charges, he may not bind the county beyond what is reasonably necessary, or for
services rendered beyond the reasonable value thereof. Kytka v. Weber County, 48
Utah 421, 160 P. Ill (1916) .
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. --20 C.J.S. Counties § 172 et seq.
U.C.A. 1953 § 17-15-17
UT ST § 17-15-17
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